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ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the use of monetary incentives to increase the supply of 
cadaver organs. The research focuses on whether a waiver of a driver's license fee can 
increase the proportion of society declaring to be a cadaver organ donor . In addition, the 
dynamics of organ donation are addressed using a bivariate regression to test if being a 
college student, religion, age , gender, income , and overall knowledge of donation has a 
significant impact on whether one chooses to be cadaver organ donor. Finally, the concern 
that a monetary and altruistic market can coexist is addressed in this research. Utilizing 
sample Z-statistics, it is found that a small incentive has the potential to significantly impact 
the number of cadaver organ donors. A significant finding is that students are more likely to 
become cadaver organ donors when offered the $30 fee waiver , whereas religion ,  gender, 
and income do not statistically impact ones decision . 
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I. Introduction 
On average, 21 people die every day awaiting an organ transplant (organdonor.org). In 
the context of economics, this phenomenon is a shortage, and in the world of the affected, it 
is the difference between life, misery, and death. Since the passage of the National Organ 
Transplant Act (NOTA), which prohibits the sale of organs for human transplantation, 
economists, philosophers, public policy experts, religious leaders, and others have debated 
the ethical and effective standing of this law. 
Increasing the supply of cadaver organ 1 donors could help to fill some of this 
shortage. Recently it has been proposed that the supply of cadaver organs could be 
increased by introducing monetary incentives to potential cadaver organ donors. This 
concept has met resistance on both ethical and empirical grounds. Referencing ethics, the 
use of incentives has been criticized for potentially victimizing the poor, advancing the black 
market, and depleting altruism within society. Although this research offers an empirical 
analysis regarding the effectiveness of a $30 incentive, this paper recognizes and 
addresses the importance of an ethical debate. 
The empirical debate surrounding the use of incentives has faced unique challenges 
due to the inadequacy of data. With the exception of Iran, China, and India, monetary 
payments for organs are illegal, leading to a predominantly theoretical dialogue. This paper 
examines the impact of a small monetary incentive in an effort to increase the number of 
cadaver organ donors. The format for this paper is as follows: Section II provides a 
literature review on previous endeavors regarding the use of incentives to increase organ 
supply, Section III elaborates on the theoretical model utilized in the research, Section IV 
describes the data, Section V utilizes Z-test statistics to test the significance of the $30 
1 Living Organ Donors donate their organs while they are still alive. They undergo a procedure to have their organs 
removed for transplantation. Cadaver Organ Donors donate their organs after their death. Their organs are removed 
within 24 to 48 hours after their death and then transplanted. 
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incentive in inducing a change in the number of cadaver organ donors. Section VI explores 
the impact of the fee waiver in the context of different demographic groups by utilizing 
binary logistic regressions, while Section VII deliberates ethical considerations. Section VIII 
concludes with policy ramifications and avenues for future research. 
II. Literature Review 
A. Titmuss and Arrow 
The debate surrounding the use of incentives to increase the supply of organs has 
remained in the theoretical realm. Richard Titmuss (1971) was the first to entertain the 
notion of offering monetary compensation for human tissue, arguing that monetary 
incentives for organs could cause market failure. He saw monetary compensation as a 
health risk due to the inclination of unhealthy individuals to partake in the market. As 
Titmuss contested, "One might infer that, in the absence of effective tests for diseases like 
hepatitis, donated blood is of better quality because donors who are not paid for their blood 
have no incentive to conceal their illnesses" (Thorne, 2006, p. 1,342). In other words, 
offering incentives degrades the quality of blood since unhealthy individuals, who before 
were not enticed to donate out of altruism, now maintain a monetary incentive to partake in 
the market. 
Furthermore, Titmuss feared incentives for human tissue would deplete altruistic 
donation, believing an altruistic and monetary market could not coexist (Titmuss, 1971). 
This axiom was founded on Titmuss's assertion that monetary markets denied individuals 
"the right to give" (1971). 
Arrow disagreed with Titmuss when he stated "Why should it be that the creation of 
a market in blood would decrease the altruism embodied in giving blood? I do not find any 
clear answers in Titmuss'" (Arrow, 1972, p.350). It can be inferred that Arrow believes that 
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altruistic and non-altruistic suppliers are motivated by different incentives, and that altruistic 
donors respond to exhortation while non-altruistic individuals respond to monetary 
incentives. Since the two suppliers respond to distinct motivators, neither subset is 
impacted by the introduction of the alternative. 
Extended studies have investigated the debate between Arrow and Titmuss. Leider 
and Roth (2010) examined Americans' approval of a monetary market for organs. They 
concluded a majority of Americans approve of a kidney market, especially when it is 
regulated by a third party, in this case the government. 
B. Case Studies 
There are few reliable studies which offer insight into compensating organ donors. 
Ashkenazi, Stoler, Cohen, and Beyar (2013) investigated The Brain-Respiratory Death Law 
and The Organ Transplantation Law, studying their impact on organ donation in Israel. 
Essentially, the law works to remove disincentives which are encountered by living donors; 
(a) earning loss reimbursement of 40 days based on the donor's average income during the 
three months prior to donation, (b) a fixed transportation refund to cover commuting costs, 
(c) reimbursement for seven days during recovery, (d) five years reimbursement of medical, 
work capability loss and insurances, (e) reimbursement of five psychological consultations 
and treatments. 
The removal of the disincentives is credited with increasing the supply of organs in 
the State. "Compared to previous years, in 2011 there was a significant increase in the 
number of deceased organ donors directly related to an increase in organ donation rate 
(from 7.8 to 11 .4 donors per million population), in parallel to a significant increase in the 
number of new registered donors" (Lavee, 2013, p. 780) . While the aforementioned are a 
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removal of disincentives, the implementation of incentives is a similar, if not identical, 
concept. 
In conjunction with Israel, a pseudo-incentivized program has been utilized in the 
state of Georgia. Until recently, the state of Georgia offered a $7 discount on driver's license 
registration fees to individuals who registered as organ donors. The discount was scrapped 
in 2005 as part of an overhaul of the driver's license registration system. Prior to this 
change Georgia had one of the highest registration rates for organ donation in the country 
(Howard, 2007). Though dangerous to assume cause and effect, the program provides 
contextual support that a relatively small monetary payment could increase the number of 
cadaver organ donors. 
C. Socio-demographics 
A substantial argument against the use of incentives is the concern of victimizing the 
poor. According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "the movement and flow of living donor organs 
-mostly kidneys- is from South to North, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, 
and from female to male bodies" (Satel, 2008, p. 59) . Furthermore, a journalist for the 
Washington Post declared "compensation for organs might exacerbate the differences 
[between rich and poor] turning the poor into surgical ward slaves or feudal donors for the 
rich" (Satel, 2008, p. 59) . These concerns both relate to living donations while this study 
seeks to investigate the use of a monetary incentive to increase the number of cadaver 
organ donors. 
In addition to socioeconomic status, Satel (2008) investigated different religious 
groups' tolerance towards compensating organ donors, focusing on Judaism, Islam, and 
Catholicism. Satel (2008) concludes that Judaism is the most receptive to a market for 
organs with Catholicism the most resistant. Regarding Islam, Satel acknowledges the 
6 
complexity within the religion noting most scholars condemn the sale of organs due to the 
acceptance that Allah owns the body; humans are not granted the right to sell organs they 
do not possess. However, Satel uncovered that a majority of Islamic scholars approve of 
such transactions, if faced with death (Satel, 2008). 
Although individual leaders and scholars within the religion have attempted to 
humanize the monetary market for organs, the overall temperance of the Catholic Church 
towards a market-based system is negative. 
"The Catholic consensus position endorses Pope John Paul II's 
opposition to the commercialization of human organs. The United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a directive asserting that 
living donor transplantation is acceptable, 'but economic advantages 
should not accrue to the donor.' The National Catholic Bioethics Center 
has stated the position even more forcefully, saying it 'strongly opposes 
any regulated market for organ sales'" (Satel, 2008, p. 162). 
D. Recent Endeavors 
Further research has been done investigating if monetary incentives can be utilized 
to increase the supply of living organ donors. Becker and Elias (2007) found that monetary 
incentives could increase the supply of organs for transplant sufficiently to eliminate the 
large queues in the organ market, and it would do so while increasing the overall cost of 
transplant surgery by no more than 12%. In estimating the cost of living kidneys and livers 
they found that an average cost for a kidney and liver transplantation was $160,000 and 
$335,000 respectively. However, these studies utilized international comparisons from 
countries that have different political stances on organ donation. For instance, the Iranian 
government has outlawed monetary compensation for cadaver organs on the grounds that it 
violates the Koran. Although an admirable attempt, utilizing estimates and international 
comparisons to compute an equilibrium price for living organs subjects the researcher to 
cultural variation in the data. 
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Adams (1999) investigated monetary incentives for organ donation in the United 
States gathering data from 392 students at Auburn University. Students were asked at 
what price they would be willing to sell their organs finding the market clearing price for 
kidneys and livers to be $1,000. However, a bias exists in the research because the 
surveyed sample is not an accurate representation of the population. Despite the empirical 
obstacles, Thorne (2006) acknowledges a vast majority of economists recognize the 
absence of an organ market has led to a quantity shortage. 
E. Cadaver Organ Donation 
The previous works investigated incentives to increase living organ donation. This 
research investigates how to increase cadaver organ donation. Thaler (2008) argued how a 
more competent donation system could increase the number of donors in the United States, 
arguing for an "opt-out" system contrary to an "opt-in." The reason for this change is that 
Thaler (2008) believes individual states could increase the quantity of organs using Kurtz 
and Saks (1996) finding that; 
"Ninety-Seven percent of respondents indicated their general support for 
transplantation. Of those who expressed their support, only 43% had the 
box checked on their driver's license. Of those who stated they personally 
wanted to donate their organs only 64% had marked their driver's license 
and only 36% had signed an organ donor card." 
This finding allows Thaler (2008) to conclude that the concrete steps necessary to 
register as an organ donor deter otherwise willing donors from registering. Recognizing the 
importance of the default, replacing an "opt-in" with an "opt-out" could have a dramatic 
impact. Despite its usefulness, Thaler (2008) recognizes the improbability of crafting a 
presumed consent, politically. His takeaway is that recognizing the "incentive" needed to 
entice organ donation is relatively small. For instance, switching from an "opt-in" vs. "opt-
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out", all else equal, a state could experience an increase in donation by 16%. This 
suggests alternate incentives could have just as, if not a more powerful impact. With this 
finding in mind this research examines if waiving a $30 driver license fee in the state of 
Illinois could entice individuals to register to become cadaver organ donors. 
III. Theory 
The theoretical construct for this research is based on the neoclassical supply and 
demand framework. This framework theorizes that an increase in the price of an organ 
results in an increase in the quantity supplied. The model maintains the following 
assumptions: (a) the quality of the organs will be the same whether sold or donated, (b) 
altruistic donors will continue to supply even after a market is introduced2, (c) when markets 
are banned, not only is the cost of the good zero, but no other costs are required to procure 
the donated good, (d) nothing can be done to increase the supply of organs when markets 
are banned (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1989). 
These assumptions have received criticism, specifically regarding the assertion that 
altruistic donations will exist after the introduction of monetary incentives and that the quality 
remains constant. As Titmuss (1971) expressed, the quality of the good may deteriorate in 
the market, since individuals now have an incentive to hide deficiencies. Second, the model 
assumes costs do not exist with altruistic donations. The model also treats individuals on a 
dichotomous scale; either as altruistic or non-altruistic. There is reason to believe the 
introduction of monetary incentives might turn altruistic donors into monetary enticed 
individuals. Even though the overall number of cadaver organs might increase, the quantity 
of altruistic donors could wither. 
2 Note: This directly contradicts Titmuss 
9 
Using this framework the research investigates if waiving a $30 driver's license fee 
can increase the supply of cadaver organ donors. Although this is a similar concept to a 
payment of schedules, the incentivized program is unique. First, respondents are trading a 
future commodity, which entails uncertainty in the transaction.3 Second, unlike the payment 
of schedules system utilized by Adams (1999), the incentive program is a take it or leave it 
option. Respondents have one avenue with which to donate their cadavers, the Illinois 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMVt Future research might explore how a specific 
incentivize program compares to an unregulated market where individuals are able to 
negotiate prices. 
Finally, the model utilized in this research could alter the demand curve for organs 
as shown in Figure 1 .  The demand curve in Figure 1 depicts individuals in need of cadaver 
organs and assumes perfect inelasticity in accordance with Adams (1999) . The supply 
curve depicts the increase in supply due to an increase in price. Note the supply curve 
does not begin at the graph's origin due to the presence of altruistic donors. This paper will 
investigate the effectiveness of the $30 dollar incentive and if the incentive could help in 
moving towards market equilibrium. 
IV. Data 
Two separate surveys were administered to students at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) 
and to residents of Bloomington IL during the fall of 2014 and the spring of 2015 to collect 
the data used in this study. The IWU survey was administered online while the Bloomington 
IL resident survey was administered through random digit dialing techniques to Bloomington 
3 A difference exists between the cost of a cadaver organ and a living organ. To donate a living organ 
there are higher opportunity costs; having to take time off of work, risk, and health concerns. These 
issues are irrelevant for cadaver organ donors and therefore may assist in explaining why the price of a 
cadaver organ is less than a living organ. Future research could expand on this topic. 
4 These alterations to a market place, are areas for future research 
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Figure 1 
Theoretical Model 
p 
D SM 
SM-Monetary Supply 
D-Demand for Organs 
Altruistic 
Donors 
Incentivized 
Donors 
Q 
residents. Overall, 498 participants completed either the phone or online surve/. The 
methods utilized in this research are similar to that employed by Adams's (1999) with the 
difference that it investigates monetary incentives as they relate to the supply of cadaver 
organs and the effectiveness of a take-it or leave-it mechanism. 
To begin, respondents were grouped based on specific answers during the survey. 
First, respondents were asked if they were cadaver organ donors. Depending on their 
response, respondents from both subsets were asked different questions. Residents of 
Bloomington who were cadaver organs were asked: 
Seeing how you are already an organ donor would you still agree to be an 
organ donor even if the Illinois DMV offered non-organ donors payment of 
$30 in order to entice them into donation?6 
5 Only students could complete the online survey 
6 Note that the respondents from the fall (online) survey were not asked this question 
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This question is an attempt to address Titmuss's (1971) concern that a 
monetary and altruistic market cannot co-exist. If a significant number of 
respondents indicate they would cease being organ donors, this supports the claim 
that the two markets cannot coexist. 
Non-organ donors were asked the following question: 
In Illinois, individuals have to pay a $30 fee when they get or renew their 
driver's license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor 
Vehicles was to waive your fee the next time you went to renew or get 
your license, only if you agreed to be an organ donor, would you then 
become an organ donor to cancel the $30 fee? 7 
This question investigates the effectiveness of a small incentive to induce cadaver 
organ donation. Complete reproductions of both surveys can be found in Appendix A. 
A. Summary Data 
Data collected from the two experimental treatments is summarized based on 
demographic information and whether the respondent were already organ donors as shown 
in Table 1. Among the 193 males in the study 65.8% (127) were already organ donors, 
while 28.60% (50) were not. Among 295 women, 66.10% (195) were already organ donors, 
while 23.72% (70) were not. Regarding religion, of the 215 Protestants 74.9% (161) were 
organ donors, of the 106 Catholics 63.20% (67) were organ donors, and of 158 Other Non-
Christians 57.59% (91) were already organ donors. 
7 Note the respondents from the fall survey were asked instead, In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a 
$30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles 
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would you then become an organ donor to cancel the 
$30 fee? The questions are essentially identical except for minor changes in the syntax. 
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Table 1 
Organ Donors Among Different Demographics 
Cadaver Organ Donor? Number (Total 498) Percentage 
Gender Men Total (193) -
Yes 127 65.8% 
No 50 28.60% 
Women Total (295) -
Yes 195 66.10% 
No 70 23.72% 
Religion Catholics Total (10G) -
Yes 67 63.20% 
No 35 33.00% 
Protestants Total (215) -
Yes 161 74.9% 
No 40 18.6% 
Other Non-Christian Total (158) -
Yes 91 57.59% 
No 40 25.31% 
V. Significance Tests 
Before testing if significant differences exist amongst the subsets in likelihood of 
being an organ donor, the data is first compared against DMV information on cadaver organ 
donors to ensure a representative sample. A two sample Z-statistic is calculated to test the 
null hypothesis that the difference between the two proportions is statistically insignificant 
(equal to zero). The results of this test can be found in Table 2 showing that the sample is 
representative of the general population. 
Table 2 
Testing the significant between samples 
Population Proportion of Cadaver Donors Results 
Bloomington 64.05% z-value-0.945 
Collected Sample 66.06% p-value=0.1723 
Testing the significant between gender 
Gender Proportion of Cadaver Donors Results 
Men 65.80% z-value=0.07 
Women 66.10% p-value=0.472 
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As is also shown in Table 1 differences do exist across gender in regards to organ 
donation, however using a two sample Z-statistic it can be concluded that the differences 
are insignificant as displayed in Table 2.  
The same procedure is utilized to discern i f  a significant difference exists among 
religions. Here it is found that differences do exist based on religious affiliation as 
Protestants are more likely to be organ donors relative to Catholics and to other non-
Christian religions. Between Catholics and Other non-Christian religions no statistical 
difference is found. These results are displayed in Table 3. 
and 
I ����Et;�;;:m-----���---------� z-value=3.52 
r probability=O.Ooo*** 
��� 
probability=O.179 
*** at the 99% Confidence Interval Level 
In looking at how the $30 fee waiver incentivizes a change in behavior Table 4 
summarizes responses by gender and religion. According to Table 4, both men and women 
are responsive to the $30 incentive but it appears men are more responsive than women. 
When examining different religions, it appears Catholics, Protestants, and the "Other 
Non-Christians" are enticed by the $30 incentive with more opting to become cadaver organ 
donors. Surprisingly, Catholics are likely to respond to the incentive, which contradicts 
earlier assertions made in the literature 
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Table 4 
Men and Women currently not Organ Donors�lntroduced to Monetary Incentive 
Response to $30 Incentive 
Gender Total No's (Per Become Organ Remain No 
Gender) Donors 
Men 50 62% (31) 38% (19) 
Women 70 58.57% (41) 41.43% (29) 
Religion Total No's (Per Become Organ Remain No 
Religion) Donors 
Catholic 35 68.57%(24) 31.42% (11) 
Protestant 40 60.00% (24) 40.00% (16) 
Other Non-Christian 40 55% (22) 45% (18) 
In testing for differences in groups a Z-statistic is calculated to test if the $30 
incentive has a significant impact amongst different subsets Table 5 provides data 
indicating whether the $30 incentive had a significant impact for the population as a whole 
and individual subsets. Column 1 in Table 5 indicates which subset is studied and the 
number in parentheses indicates the total number in the subset. Column 2 presents the 
total number of individuals from the subsets who are organ donors before the introduction of 
the $30 incentive. Column 3 contains the new percentage of individuals who become an 
organ donor due to the introduction of the $30 incentive while column 4 tests to see if the 
difference between the original and new proportion is significant. 
The results of the Z-statistic displays that the $30 dollar incentive is significant at the 
1% level meaning it can increase the proportion of cadaver organ donors. Although the 
data set is cross-sectional and utilizes a small number of cases, the finding gives positive 
empirical evidence that a minor incentive can increase the proportion of organ donors 
among a population. 
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Table 5 
Is the $30 Incentive Significant for Each Subset? 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Population Original New Significance 
Yes- Number ? 
Before of Yes (One Sample z-test) 
Incentive because 
$30 
incentive 
Total 66.06% 80.52% z-statistic-6.814 
Probability=O.OO'" 
(498) 329 401=329+ 
72 -
Men 65.80% 81.87% z-statistic-4.71 
Probability=O.OO'" 
(193) 127 158-1127 
+31 -
Women 66.10% 80.00% z-statistic-5.04 
Probability=O.OO'" 
(295) 195 236-195+ -
41 
Protestants 74.88% 86.05% z-statistic-3.78 
Probabilitv=O.OO'" 
(215) 161 185-161+ -
24 
Catholics 63.21% 85.85% z-statistic-4.83 
Probability=O.OO'" 
(106) 67 91-67+24 -
"Other Non- 57.59% 84.78%% z-statistic-6.92 
Christian" Probabilitv=O.OO'" 
(158) 91 113-91+2 
2 
The number in the parentheses indicates what total the percentage is calculated from. 
'Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval, "Significant at the 95% Confidence Interval, ••• Significant at the 99% 
Level 
In breaking down the sample population into sub-groups it is found each subset is 
enticed by the $30 incentive. This suggests that willingness to accept the $30 incentive is 
not limited by gender or religiosity. This finding differs from previous literature that religious 
groups have different attitudes towards cadaver organ donation. 
Table 6 attempts to address Titmuss concern that a significant reduction in altruistic 
donors will occur because of the monetary incentive. These results suggest that when 
examining the population as a whole, the introduction of the monetary market does deplete 
altruistic donations. The same holds true when analyzing each of the different subsets 
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Table 6 
Will introduction of monetary market cause altruistic donors to deplete? 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Population Original Loss of Significance 
Yes- altruistic ? 
Before donors (One Sample z-test) 
Market 
Total 100% 86.61% z-statistic-19.85 
Probability=O.OO*** 
(254) 254 220-254-
34 -
Men 100% 86.14% z-statistic-12.98 
Probabilitv=O.OO*** 
(101 ) 101 87-101-14 
-
Women 100% 87.00% z-statistic-14.57 
Probability=O.OO*** 
(146) 146 127-146- -
19 
Protestants 100% 88.55% z-statistic=12.02 
Probabilitv=O.OO*** 
(131 ) 131 116-131- -
15 
Catholics 100% 93.18% z-statistic-3.88 
Probability=O.OO*** 
(44) 44 41-44-3 -
"Other Non- 100% 81.94% z-statistic=14.55 
Christian" Probability=O.OO'" 
72 72 59-72-13 
The number in the parentheses indicates what total the percentage is calculated from. 
*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval, *'Significant at the 95% Confidence Interval, **. Significant at the 99% 
Level 
However, these findings must be taken with a degree of caution. While administering the 
phone banking survey, there was some confusion amongst respondents if they themselves 
would need to partake in the monetary market. In short, some respondents may have 
indicated "no" to remaining organ donors because they themselves believed they would 
have to take the monetary incentive, when instead the question itself was meant to entice 
non-organ donors. Future endeavors should explore if the findings of this paper are 
accurate portrayals or a result a survey design flaw. 
VI. Multivariate Empirical Model 
A multivariate empirical model is estimated to explore if the willingness to accept the 
$30 incentive is impacted by socio-demographic factors, while also examining if willingness 
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to remain an organ donor is impacted by the same demographics. Table 7 provides 
information regarding the variables used to estimate the regression equationsB• 
Table 7 
Information regarding Regressions 
Variable Type Code Definition 
Become an organ donor Dependent 1-Yes, becomes organ If the respondent would become an 
because of $30 incentive donor organ donor because of the $30 
O=No, does not become incentive. 
an organ donor 
Willingness to remain an Dependent 1-Yes Stay an organ 
organ donor donor 
O=No, does not stay an 
orQan donor 
Student Independent 1-Student Indicated if the respondent was a 
O=Non-Student student 
Catholic Independent 1-Catholic Examines if the respondent is Catholic 
O=Other 
White Independent 1-Caucasian Indicates if the respondent is Caucasian 
O=Other 
Protestant Independent 1-Protestant Indicates if the respondent is a 
O=Other Protestant 
Knowledge of Someone Independent 1-Know Someone on Indicates if the person knows someone 
on Dialysis kidney dialysis on kidney dialysis 
O=Other 
Male Independent 1-Respondent is Male Indicates if the respondent is male 
O=Other 
Age Independent Continuous Variable Gives the ape of the respondent 
Regression One 
(YES_ACCEPTlNG_$30) = C+{31(WHITE) + {32(STUDENT) + {33(CATHOLlC) + {34(PROTESTANT) + e 
The results from Regression One are located in Table 8. When the independent 
variables are observed in concert, only the STUDENT variable is significant. Overall, being 
a student increases the likelihood of accepting the $30 incentive. This means that 
participants who were students were more likely to accept the $30 incentive relative to 
nonstudents. The independent variables WHITE, CATHOLIC, and PROTESTANT are all 
insignificant indicating that these descriptors do not impact the decision to be an organ 
donor among those willing to accept the $30 incentive to be an organ donor. Again, this 
finding has positive implications for policy ramifications. This is additional evidence that the 
8 Since the dependent measurement, is dichotomous in nature a binary logistic regression is utilized. 
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$30 incentive would not be limited by gender or religiosity, an idea which is elaborated in 
the conclusions. 
Table 8 
Binary Logistic Regression 
(Willingness to Accept $30 Incentive) 
C -0.746 
Probability (0.117) 
White 0.617 
Probability (0.180) 
Student 0.716 
Probability (0.074)* 
Catholic 0.728 
Probability (0.136) 
Protestant 0.393 
Probability (0.399) 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.066 
N 121 
*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval Level,**Significant at the 95% Confidence 
Interval Level, *** Significant at the 99% Confidence Interval Level 
The second regression investigates if willingness to remain an organ donor after the 
introduction of the monetary incentive is impacted by demographic characteristics9. For 
instance, perhaps those who practice a religion will cease to be organ donors after the 
introduction of the market. 
Regression TWO 
(Willingness_ To_Remain_An_ Organ_Donor) = C+(31 (WHITE) + (32(KNOW_SOMEONE_ ON_DIAL YS/S) 
+ (33(AGE) + (34(CA THOLlC) + (35(PROTESTANT) + (34(MALE) + e 
Overall, it appears knowledge of someone on kidney dialysis makes an individual 
less likely to remain an organ donor after the introduction of the market. However, being 
Catholic or Protestant makes an individual more likely to remain an organ donor after the 
introduction of the market, which directly contradicts previous theories. A significant finding 
is that race, religion, and age does not impact ones willingness to remain an organ donor after 
the implementation of the monetary incentive. Recall, there are concerns regarding this 
questions validity. 
9 This regression only utilized data which was collected from the spring. 
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Table 9 
Binary Logistic Regression 
(Willingness to Remain and Organ Donor) 
C 1.611 
Probabifity (O.044)*' 
White 0.527 
Probabifity (0.283) 
Know Someone on 
Dialysis -0.849 
Probability (0.032)** 
Age -0.010 
Probabifity (0.351) 
Catholic 1.499** 
Probabifity 0.030 
Protestant 0.756* 
Probability 0.065 
Male 0.092 
Probability 0.818 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.061 
N 254 
*Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval Level,**Significant at the 95% Confidence 
Interval Level, *** Significant at the 99% Confidence Interval Level 
Evidence that the data to this question might be subject to substantial noise is the finding 
that knowing someone on kidney dialysis will make an individual less likely to remain an organ 
donor. Theoretically, if one knows someone suffering on kidney dialysis, why would they be 
more likely to cease being organ donor due to a government intervention to remove the organ 
shortage? Further research is necessary to truly understand this result from this survey 
question. 
VII. Ethical Considerations 
Returning to the two major objections to a monetary incentive program (the 
exploitation and religious freedom objections) this paper seeks to shed some light on these 
concerns in view of the collected data. Although this is not an exhaustive list, addressing 
these objections adds validity in utilizing the aforementioned policy as an approach to close 
the gap in the observed organ shortage. As these two concerns are considered it is 
important to highlight the differences in living and cadaver organ donation. 
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A. The Exploitation Objection 
The first and most recurrent objection is the exploitation objection or the concern "the 
poor would become the walking organ banks of the well-to-do" (Satel, 2008). In addressing 
this objection, differentiate between the terms equality and exploitation. As Lawlor (2011) 
accounts, the term explOitation is often confused with equality. 
"We can, for example, object that the rich can buy organs while the poor 
cannot, without having this having anything to do with exploitation, or without 
claiming that those who do buy organs are exploiting the poor, or anyone 
else. If I claim that it is unfair and unjust that the rich can buy health care not 
available to the poor I am complaining about inequality" (Lawlor, 252, 2011). 
Essentially, the objection of equality claims the rich have the financial means to buy 
organs but the poor cannot afford to do so. This concern of equality is not applicable to the 
suggested policy because a free-market is not developed. The DMV simply waives the 
driver's license fee for the individual, enticing them into donation. Organs are still 
transplanted on a need-be basis. However, a sincere objection can be made that the poor 
are more likely to participate in the program, as opposed to the wealthy. First, this research 
analyzed if willingness to accept the $30 incentive was related to economic standing finding 
that income does not explain why individuals choose to become organ donors. For sake of 
discussion, suggest the findings are inadequate. Perhaps economically disadvantaged 
individuals are more likely to accept the incentive compared to the wealthier. Greasley 
(2012) coins the term "defected consent," explaining why the use of monetary incentives, in 
a living organ donation context causes exploitation stating: 
"The problem of exploitation in this context is often referred to as an issue of 
'defective consent' on the part of the vendor, whose poverty and desperation 
precludes him from making a 'truly autonomous' choice to exchange his 
organ for money" (Greasley, 52, 2012). 
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It can be inferred that the dire circumstances of the poor prevent the individual from 
reaching a rational, independent decision. However, the aforementioned was in regards to 
living donation in which payment to the supplier surpasses thousands of dollars. The 
suggested policy in this research utilizes a $30 incentive to induce people to become 
cadaver organ donors, not living organ donors. If an individual has strong convictions 
against donation, would $30 truly suppress autonomy? 
In addition, Greasley (2012) accounts that exploitation requires the party surrender 
something of use, which can include items like sex, labor, organs, etc. However, in the 
case of cadaver donation, the vendor never forgoes a useable good. All organs remain 
intact and only after the demise of the individual are transplantable organs removed in a 
proper manner. Since organs have no use to a deceased body the individual never 
surrenders a useable good and is therefore incapable of being exploited. 
There are additional problems with the exploitation objection. As Lawlor (2011) 
accounts, the argument assumes that the person donating the organ (in the context of living 
donation), is the exploited party. However, this perception is incomplete from examining the 
following passage, 
"Mark Schofield has waited for more than four years for the kidney transplant 
which would save his life and let him see his children grow up. But after finally 
losing patience, he flew to the Philippines with 40,000 in savings ready to buy 
a new organ from a living donor. The 43-year-old-hopes to find a poverty­
stricken Filipino desperate enough to sell him a kidney" (Lawlor, 252). 
In the aforementioned, it is unclear which party is exploited. Common belief asserts 
the Filipino as the exploited party, but as Lawlor accounts exploitation derives from the 
individual possessing the greatest amount of bargaining power. For instance, if Mr. 
Schofield has ten economically disadvantaged Filipinos willing to sell their kidneys, he is in 
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position to exploit. However, if only one supplier exists, Mr. Schofield, in a direr situation, is 
the exploited party. 
Essentially, the practice of selling organs is not inherently exploitative, but it is the 
balance of power which proliferates the possibility. Again, the aforementioned only holds 
true in a free-market. This policy is unique because it recommends monetary compensation 
for cadaver organs and the DMV utilizes an incentive structure to entice cadaver organ 
donation. Organs are useless to an individual upon their demise, making it impossible to 
exploit a cadaver organ donor. 
B. Religious Freedom Objection 
The second objection is the religious freedom objection. A person from a faith which 
disapproves of organ donation might claim the suggested policy is unlawful and 
discriminates against their religion since, for religious reasons, they are not allowed to 
partake in the $30 program. Currently, for many government programs in the United States, 
exclusion is common practice. For instance, Jehovah Witnesses are not allowed to enlist in 
a military branch, yet the govemment provides a military to fulfil its constitutional obligation 
to provide for the common defense. More importantly, the army is providing financial 
resources to individuals which can reach thousands of dollars. For instance, private 
soldiers earn over $18,000 per year and on advancement could earn more than $50,000 
per year. It therefore seems inconsistent to accept one government program but to deny 
the other, especially when the latter provides greater financial support. 
In addition, the Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) which was passed in 1993 
provides a strict scrutiny test, known as the sherbert test, to ensure the government does 
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the state has public interest 
in doing so. Initially, the language of the act suggests the state cannot infringe on the 
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practice of religion. The policy suggested does not tax or fine a religion; it simply offers a 
reward for donation. An individual is free to practice their religion, with no additional penalty 
or burden since the driver's license fee was already in place. 
The RFRA also provides exceptions for the state to invoke a policy even if it was to 
infringe on an individual's religion. A policy must improve a government's interest, ideally 
an interest which relates to a constitutional concern. Since the constitution states the 
government has the authority to promote the general welfare, efforts to increase organ 
donation falls within constitutional limits. If public concern is prevalent surrounding the 
religious freedom objection, clauses can be written into the program to excuse members of 
a certain faith. For instance, a clause might exclude all Jehovah Witnesses from having to 
pay the $30, regardless if they agree to donate. 
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This research began with the goal to empirically test if the wavier of a $30 driver 
license fee could significantly increase the quantity of cadaver organ donors. Utilizing a 
sample Z-statistic, it was discovered that the incentive structure could increase the quantity 
of cadaver organ donors. In addition, this paper utilized binary logistic regressions to test if 
certain demographics might influence individuals' willingness to accept the monetary 
inventive. Uncovering that race, gender, age, religion, and income did not impact an 
individual's willingness to accept the $30 incentive has strong policy ramifications. First, 
finding an insignificant income variable suggest policy makers need not worry about the 
exploitation of the poor. Second, since religiosity was also found to be insignificant, the 
suggested policy would not need to be tailored for specific religions. 
Third, utilizing this research 's finding with Thaler's (2008), the significant student 
variable suggests that policy makers should direct their attention towards student 
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populations and utilize the $30 incentive to encourage registering to be a cadaver organ 
donor. Once enrolled, the students are unlikely to "opt-out" indicating the incentive need 
only be used once per individual. 
Future research should expand on this data with a sample that has more variety. 
While the dataset is similar to the general populous of central Illinois this populous is not an 
accurate representation of all citizens within the United States. It may be that different 
states' residents behave differently to the monetary incentive. In addition, this paper 
suggests exploring additional incentive based structures beyond the $30 incentive to 
increase cadaver organ donation. For instance, changing the fee structure by groupings to 
see if the elasticity of organ donor's changes by fee would allow for an investigation into 
what is the optimal fee waiver needed to induce different groups into registering to be 
cadaver organ donors. 
This paper recognizes the on-going debate, concem, and reality of organ donation. 
This $30 incentive is just one tool of many that should be investigated and possibly used to 
increase the quantity of cadaver organ donors. Another day of the status quo is another 21 
deaths due to the current shortage. This paper challenges the status quo and welcomes 
others too in order to close the shortage gap of organs. 
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Appendix 
Survey for Honors Research 
(Phone Survey Used in Spring) 
Good Evening is available? Hi my name is and I am a student at Illinois 
Wesleyan University (IWU). IWU is conducting research in regards to individuals' attitudes 
towards organ donation and we would appreciate your input. 
The purpose of this study is to examine if monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the 
supply of cadaver organs. 
The length of time you will be involved with this study is approximately 5 minutes, and you will 
be asked to complete a phone survey. 
The records of this study will be kept private and your participation is voluntary. You have the 
right to refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
Step 1 
1 .  Do you wish to participate in the survey 
1 . 1 .  Yes (Continue on to Step 2) 
1 .2. No (If they answer "No" the survey is over and say Thank you for your time) 
Step 2-Demographics 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the survey. I will now ask some demographic questions. 
1 .  What year were you born? Enter year (Ex. 1989) ___ -
2. What race would you say you a member of? (Make sure you list the choices) 
2.1 .  African American/African/Black/Caribbean 
2.2. Asian/Pacific Islander 
2.3. Caucasian (Non Hispanic) 
2.4. Hispanic/Latino 
2.5. Native American 
2.6. Prefer not to answer 
3. Are you Married? 
3.1 .  Yes 
3.2. No 
3.3. Prefer Not to Answer 
4. Are you male, female, or prefer not to answer? (If you can tell by their voice, no 
reason to ask this question) 
4.1.  Male 
4.2. Female 
4.3. Prefer not to answer/ Do not know 
5.  Including yourself, how many people live in your household? 
5.1 .  Write down the numbe� ___ -
6. If any, which organized religion are you a member of? 
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6. 1 .  Protestant/Other Christian 
6.2. Catholic 
6.3. Mormon 
6.4. Jewish 
6.5. Islam 
6.6. Other non-Christian religion 
6.7. Prefer not to answer 
6.B. Not Applicable 
Step 3-Questions Regarding Organ Donation 
Thank you for completing the first part of the survey, now I would like to get your opinion 
regarding organ donation. 
1 .  Do you know of a friend or relative who is on kidney dialysis? 
1 . 1 .  Yes 
1 .2. No 
1.3. Prefer Not to Answer 
2. Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been an organ donor? 
2.1 .  Yes 
2.2. No 
2.3. Prefer Not to Answer 
3. Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a recipient of donor 
organs? 
3. 1 .  Yes 
3.2. No 
3.3. Prefer Not to Answer 
Step 4- You are almost done and this is the final section of the survey. As you may know, there 
is an enormous need for organ donors throughout the United States. In 2012, more than 6,500 
people died waiting for an organ transplant, and over a thousand more suffer on waiting lists. 
Increasing cadaver organ donation is one way to limit this shortage. 
Now I would like to ask you some questions in regards to cadaver organ donation. 
1. Do you have an Illinois driver's license? 
1 . 1  Yes 
1.2 No 
1.3 Prefer Not to Answer/Do not Know 
2. Are you already an organ donor? (If they answer "no" or "prefer not to 
got to # 3. If they answer "yes" go to question #4.) 
2.1 Yes 
2.2 No 
2.3 Prefer Not to Answer 
answer" 
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3. In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get or renew their driver's 
license. With this in mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee the 
next time you went to renew or get your licence, only if you agreed to be a cadaver organ donor, 
would you then become one to cancel the $30 fee? 
3.4. Yes 
3.5. No 
3.6. Prefer Not to Answer 
4. Seeing how you are already an organ donor would still agree to be an organ 
donor even if the Illinois DMV offered non-organ donors payment of $30 in order 
to entice them into donation? 
4.1.  Yes 
4.2. No 
4.3. Do not know 
4.4. Prefer not to answer 
5. Last question, what would you say is your household's annual income? 
5.1 .  Below 10,000 
5.2. 10,000 to 40,000 
5.3. 40,000 to 80,000 
5.4. 80,000 to 120,000 
5.5. Above 120,000 
5.6. Prefer not to answer 
Thank you for completing the survey. We appreciate your input and time. If you have questions, 
you may contact the researcher(s) via email at dtruesda@iwu.edu. If you have questions or 
concerns regarding this study and would like to speak with someone other than the 
researcher(s), you may contact Dr. Leah Nillas, Institutional Review Board Chair, Illinois 
Wesleyan University, at 309-556-3437, Inilas@iwu.edu. 
Survey for Honors Research 
(Online Survey Used in Fall) 
Monetary Market for Organ Donation 
You are invited to be a participant in a research study about monetary markets for organs. You were 
selected as a possible participant because you are enrolled at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU). We ask 
that you read this document and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
The study is being conducted by Mr. Daniel Truesdale a student at IWU and Professor Craig Broadbent 
of Illinois Wesleyan U niversity. 
The purpose of this study is to examine if monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the supply of 
cadaver orga ns. 
The length of time you will be involved with this study is approximately 30 minutes, you will be asked to 
complete a survey. 
If you agree to participate, we will ask you to complete a list of questions from an online survey. 
30 
The records of this study will be kept private. The data will be anonymous and only Professor Broadbent 
and Mr. Truesdale will have access to the data. Any sort of report that is published or presentation that 
is given, will not include any individual specific information. 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect 
your 
current or future relations with Illinois Wesleyan University or any of its representatives. You have the 
right to 
refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits 
At this time, you may ask any questions you have about this study or about the informed consent 
process. If you 
have questions later, you may contact the researcher(s) at (309) 556-3711, dtruesda@iwu.edu. 
If you have questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to speak with someone other than 
the 
researcher(s), you may contact Dr. Brian Brennan, I nstitutional Review Board Chair, Illinois Wesleyan 
University, at 309-556-3972, bbrenna1@iwu.edu. 
If you would like a copy of this form for your records please contact dtruesda@iwu.edu and a form will 
be em ailed to you. 
I have read and understood the above explanations, and my questions have been addressed. The 
information that I 
provide will be used for research purposes only. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
I may 
withdraw anytime without penalty. If I have any concerns about my experience in this study (e.g., that I 
was 
treated unfairly or felt unnecessarily threatened), I may contact the researchers or the Chair of the IWU 
Institutional Review Board regarding my concerns. I voluntarily consent to participate in this research 
study. (By clicking "Yes" and advancing to next page, you agree to the study). 
Do you wish to participate in the online survey? 
o 
o 
r 
r 
Yes 
No 
Information on Organ Donation 
There is an enormous need for organ donors throughout the United States. In 2012, more than 6,500 
people died waiting for an organ transplant. How Cadaver Organ Donation Works: All lifesaving efforts 
are made to save a person's life without regard to their status as an organ/tissue donor. It is only after 
these efforts have failed and someone is declared dead that recovery efforts begin. The staff at the 
hospital, for which the individual is deceased, is not involved with the recovery process and does not 
have access to the Secretary of State Organ/Tissue Donor Registry. When death occurs or is imminent, 
the hospital staff contacts the organ procurement organization (OPO) to report the death. The OPO 
sends clinical staff to the hospital if it is likely that donation is possible. The OPO contacts the Secretary 
of State's donor registry hotline to find out if the person is listed in the registry. If the person is in the 
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registry, the trained OPO staff will work with the family, explaining the process, gathering information 
and provide support. If he/she is not in the registry, family will be educated about the process and asked 
for consent to donate. Each potential donor is evaluated to see what organs/tissue can be recovered for 
transplantation. The number of organs/tissue recovered varies from person to person. The United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) manages the list of patients waiting for transplants. A computer 
program matches donor organs with recipients based on certain matching criteria such as blood and 
tissue type, height and weight, as well as how sick the patient is, how long they have been waiting and 
distance from donor to patient. About 75 percent of all organs go to local patients. Recovery is a surgical 
procedure where the donor is treated with dignity and respect, and the body restored to allow for an 
open-casket visitation. Al l  funeral and burial or cremation options may take place after donation. I n  
order t o  register a s  an organ donor in I l l inois, you must b e  a t  least 18 years old. * * If you are younger 
than 18 years old, your parents, next of kin, or legal guardians have the responsibility of making the 
decision about organ donation. When an individual registers, the organ donor registry will carry out 
their wish to donate your organs and tissues upon your death. The individual's family will NOT have to 
pay any amount for the removal of your organs. Although everyone is eligible for organ donation 
(regardless of age, race, or medical history), medical professionals make determinations whether the 
organs are suitable for transplant once an organ donor has deceased. Below is a list ofthe top Myths 
regarding organ donation: Doctors don't work with the same urgency to save an individual's life if they 
know their an organ donor: Many people are concerned that if they sign up to be an organ donor, they 
won't get the same level of care should they end up in a life or death situation. However, this is not true. 
Your doctor is obligated to have one singular aim: to save your life. If you are a registered donor, a 
doctor might declare you dead before it's appropriate: This is a common myth that scares many people 
out of registering to donate. However, the o pposite is actually true. Organ donors are given more tests 
to determine official death than those patients who haven't agreed to organ donation. Doctors will take 
all of your organs, even if you only want to donate one: You can specify which organs you are willing to 
donate. Only the organ(s) you identify will be donated. Organs are sold on the black market: There are 
many urban legends involving frightening tales of organs being stolen and sold for profit. The process of 
donation is so complex and medically involved that this is not viable in the U.S. A transplant necessitates 
all of the following: Highly trained doctors. Modern healthcare facilities. Matching of donors to 
recipients. Other medical support. We would like to ask a few questions about you before we proceed 
to questions about organ donation. 
All_Questions 
Year you were born 
Race 
n 
African America n/ African/Black/Caribbea n 0 
n Asian/Pacific Islander 0 
r 
Caucasian (Non Hispanic) 0 
r 
Hispanic/Latino 0 
r 
Native American 0 
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o Prefer not to answer 
Are you married? 
0 r Y es 
r, 
0 No 
r 
0 Prefer not to answer 
Gender 
r 
0 Male 
r 
0 Female 
r o Prefer not to answer 
How many people, besides yourself, live in your household? 
o r O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
More than 5 
What is your personal aggregate annual income? 
'Include income from al l  external factors: (Parents, Guardians, Scholarships, Part-Time Job, etc.) 
r 0 
r 
0 
r 
0 
r 
0 
r 
0 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000-$29,999 
$30,000-$49,999 
$50,000-$99,999 
$100,000-$249,000 
r o $250,000 or more 
Are you a member of an organized religion? 
C Yes 0 
r 
No 0 
r, Prefer not to answer 0 
If yes, which organized religion are you a member of? 
r o Protestant/Other Christian 
o Catholic 
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r Mormon 0 
r Jewish 0 
r 
Muslim 0 
r Other non-Christian religion 0 
r Prefer not to answer 0 
r 
o Not Applicable 
Organ Donation Questions 
Do you know of a friend or relative who is on dialysis? 
r Yes 0 
r No 0 
r Prefer not to answer 0 
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a organ donor? 
r 
o Yes 
o No 
o Prefer not to answer 
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever been a recipient of donor organs? 
r 
Yes o 
o 
o 
r 
r 
No 
Prefer not to answer 
Would you be offended by the purchase and sale of cadaver organs, even if such transaction 
saved lives? 
r Yes 0 
r No 0 
r Do not know 0 
Would you be offended by a government program which would allow your organs to be 
removed at death without your explicit permission? 
r 
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
If yes, would you still be offended by a governmental policy which would allow your organs to 
be removed at death without your explicit permission, even if you could prevent such removal 
by prefiling, prior to your death, a statement denying such permission? 
r 
Yes o 
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o No 
r 
o Do not know 
Which organs would you be willing to donate after you are deceased? 
'Select "All" if you would donate al l  your organs 
r Heart 0 
r Lungs 0 
r Liver 0 
0 r Pancreas 
r Kidneys 0 
r Small Intestines 0 
r All 0 
Which organs would you not be willing to donate after you are deceased? 
'Select "All" if you would not donate any of your organs 
r Heart 0 
r Lungs 0 
r Liver 0 
r Pancreas 0 
r Kidneys 0 
r Small I ntestines 0 
r All 0 
Do you have a illinois driver's license? 
r 
Yes 0 
r No 0 
r 
Prefer not to answer 0 
If yes to the last question, then the respondents followed this track. 
Monetary Market for Organ Donation 
Illinois Questions 
If yes, do you know you can become a cadaveric organ donor through your driver's license by 
joining the First-Person Consent Organ/Tissue Donor Registry by submitting a form online, by 
calling 1-800-210-2106 or by visiting your nearest Secretary of State facility. 
r 
o Yes 
r· 
No o 
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Are you already a cadaveric organ donor? 
'You can consult you Illinois Driver's License to verify if you are a cadaveric organ donor 
r Yes 0 
r 
No 0 
r, Do not know 0 
If answered no or do not know, respondents were asked the following 
Illinois Driver Incentive 
In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in 
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee, only if you became 
an organ donor, would you then become an organ donor to cancel the $30 fee? 
o 
o 
o 
r 
r 
r 
Yes 
No 
Do not know 
If answered yes, respondents were asked the following 
I l l inois Driver Incentive-For Donors 
In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when they get their driver's license. With this in 
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive your fee, only if you became 
an organ donor, would you have been more enticed to become an organ donor in order to 
cancel the $30 fee? 
o 
o 
o 
r 
r 
r 
Yes 
No 
Do not know 
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